In a financial market, it is often changes in the asset price that act as the trigger for transactions or shifts in investment position. For agents with long investment horizons, and under normal market conditions, trades may only occur infrequently, while for other agents, or at times of severe market stress, the timescales involved may be much shorter. We argue that in either case the use of price thresholds to simulate agent behaviour has some important and desirable features.
Introduction
Economists and physicists have uncovered seemingly universal statistical properties of real markets, many of which deviate from those predicted by efficient market assumptions. These are often referred to as the 'stylized facts' [8, 19] and there now exist many different heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) that can replicate the most important ones: the lack of correlations in the pricereturns at all but the shortest timescales; apparent power-law decays for the frequency of large magnitude price changes ; and volatility clustering. It is not our intention to review the vast HAM literature here (a valuable overview can be found in [21] ). However, many of the models suffer from one or more of the following (related) problems.
Firstly, they tend to be constructed without due regard to the actual process by which agents arrive at their chosen course of action. This makes it difficult to argue why one kind of agent model should be preferred over another which in turn makes it harder to convince orthodox economists to take any of the them seriously.
Secondly, at the level of individuals, many of the recent findings of behavioural economics [16, 12, 15, 5] are ignored. Similarly, larger-scale market structures and institutions may have rational-but-complex motivations and perverse incentives which are also excluded.
A third common problem is that agents are treated as Markovian in the sense that their recent past does not influence their future behaviour. It occurs in those models that, for example, probabilistically switch agents between investment positions or trading strategies [2, 1] .
Finally, many models are sensitive to the size of the system and when the number of agents M → ∞ some of the stylized facts, such as excess kurtosis, can even disappear altogether. A frequent cause of this modelling issue is related to the Markovian modelling of the agents mentioned above -the Central Limit Theorem and The Law of Large Numbers remove any endogeneous fluctuations in the continuum limit.
Previous work [10, 9, 11, 18] has shown that the use of price thresholds to trigger agent activity bypasses these problems while allowing for the modelling of multiple real-world phenomena in a plausible and consistent manner. Furthermore, the efficient market/rational expectations paradigm exists as a special case within this framework which makes possible a systematic study of the ways in which irrational behaviour and other 'imperfections' perturb the neoclassical solution.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that queueing theory [6] can provide both insights and analytical tools for studying the fat-tailed price returns generated by such threshold models. The largest price changes are due to cascades of buying or selling and their distribution can be reinterpreted as the distribution of the busy-period of a single-server queue -the length of time for which a queue exists after it has begun. There are many results concerning the distribution of this random variable under varying assumptions on the arrival rate, departure rate and service time of customers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the moving threshold models first introduced in [18] . In particular, a separation of timescales argument is used to better motivate the modeling assumptions. It is then shown that while such models are capable of incorporating many different agents and trading motivations, they can also provide a a valuable test of the rational expectations [20] hypothesis which lies behind the concept of the 'representative agent' and most orthodox micro-and macro-economic modeling. This point is emphasized with numerical simulations that display fat-tailed price returns when the rational expectations assumption breaks down due to herding.
The class of models in Section 2 assumes a separation of timescales and operates over long time periods. However, the (instantaneous) cascade process responsible for the largest price changes can also be used as a stand-alone model for very rapid price-deleveraging, say. Thus, in Section 3 we consider such cascades and, after a brief overview of queueing theory, demonstrate the very close connection between the two. Standard queueing theory results concerning the distribution of the busy-period of single-server queues then suggest a novel, but incomplete, explanation of the fat-tailed nature of price returns in financial markets.
A Threshold Model Over Long Timescales

A continuous time model
We consider a market with asset or index price p(t) at (continuous) time t and introduce a separation of timescales. Information arrives continuously and results in instantaneous price changes that are implemented by 'fast' agents who are primarily motivated by such new information rather than price (these agents will not directly simulated in the time-discretized version since they operate over very small timescales). There are also, however, M 'slow' agents, who are motivated primarily by price changes, and act over much longer timescales (typically weeks or months). Each of these M agents can be either long (the state +1) or short (the state −1) the asset at any moment in time 2 . At time t the i th agent is represented by its state, ±1, and an interval Figure 1 ). Whenever p(t) crosses this interval, agent i is deemed to be no longer comfortable with her current investment position, switches states, and the interval I(i, t) is updated so that p(t) is again an interior point. Also, the action of switching causes a small jump in the price caused by the change in buy/sell pressure. Thus at time t the system is represented by the price p(t), the states of the agents, and M closed intervals each of which includes the value p(t). We shall refer to the endpoints of the intervals as thresholds and the behaviour of the system will be defined by rules governing both the dynamics of p(t) and the thresholds. Before describing the kinds of rules that can be incorporated into such a framework a few general remarks are in order.
The above model bears a resemblance to order-book models [22] that attempt to describe how trades are cleared. In such models, the price typically moves along the positive real line and potential buyers and sellers are matched when the price is acceptable to both parties. However, the differences are more profound than the similarities. Order-book models are concerned with very short timescales and how trades are executed. Here we are concerned with much longer timescales and why trades are placed -it is implicitly assumed that the market is liquid (the fast sellers provide the necessary pool of liquidity) and all trades can be executed without explicitly matching buyers and sellers.
A discrete-time version
We require time-discretized models that are suitable for computer simulations. First a timestep h is chosen, typically less than one trading day. The state of the i th slow agent over the n th time interval is represented by s i (n) = ±1. The price of the asset at the start of the n th time interval is p(n) and for simplicity the system is drift-free so that p(n) actually corresponds to the price relative to the risk-free interest rate plus equity-risk premium or the expected rate of return. We shall not necessarily assume that agents are of uniform size (in terms of their trading positions) and weight the i th agent by its size w i and define W = M i=1 w i . A key variable is the sentiment defined as the weighted average of the states of all of the M investors
and ∆σ(n) = σ(n) − σ(n − 1). The price p(n) evolves according to the rule
where κ > 0 and √ hη(n) ∼ N (0, h) represents the exogenous information stream. Note that when κ = 0 and f ≡ 1 the price follows a geometric Brownian motion (the term −h/2 is the drift correction required by Itô calculus). The function f (σ, n) allows the effect of new information on the marketplace to vary with sentiment and/or time and is discussed further below.
The rules governing the dynamics of the thresholds are implemented as follows. The thresholds for each agent change (usually slowly) between switchings and correspond to that agent's evolving strategy. If, at the end of a timestep, an agent's interval is crossed by the price, then that agent switches and the corresponding change in σ will feed into the price at the next iteration. This choice of synchronous updating is for two reasons. It is computationally convenient but it also reflects the fact that even after a slow trader decides to react, there is likely to be some delay in effecting the trade (unlike the fast traders). In the simulations that follow, h is chosen to correspond to 1/10 of a day and then the daily price returns are computed).
The model thus has two fundamental, and separable, components -one governs the motion of the price p(n), given by (2) , and the other governs the motion of the thresholds. Or, equivalently, one set of rules describes the fast agents and the other describes the slow ones. We now discuss which phenomena can be incorporated into such a model.
Firstly, in the pricing formula (2) the law of supply and demand is reproduced for κ > 0 -increasing/decreasing σ causes the price to rise/fall. Its magnitude (relative to f ) determines the extent to which price changes are determined by changes in sentiment versus the arrival of new information. If the function f ≡ 1 then the fast traders are accurately and instantly converting information into price changes. We posit, however, that this is not necessarily the case. For example during times of extreme sentiment f (σ, n) may be greater, perhaps due to a surplus of speculators [7] or excessive attention being paid to information in an environment where market conditions are perceived to be due for a correction of some kind. This mechanism is undoubtedly too simplistic but nevertheless tying volatility to sentiment in this way results in realistic volatility clustering [18] . Or one can instead exploit the explicit dependence of f upon n to recreate changes in market conditions with time or to introduce a stochastic volatility model. And of course it is still being assumed that the information stream is Gaussian and uncorrelated with itself -weakening these highly unrealistic assumptions provides additional mechanisms for volatility clustering. In realworld markets, all of these mechanisms are probably present to some degree or another.
However the focus of this paper is on the fat-tailed price returns, and previous results [10, 11, 18, 17] suggest that these are caused by the threshold dynamics rather than the pricing mechanism. This brings us to the important issue of the thresholds themselves. If agent i is perfectly rational then the values L i (n) and U i (n) represent the cumulative effect of rigorous market analysis and future expectations. Thus the price interval [L i (n), U i (n)] defines that agent's (conscious and deliberate) trading strategy. Or in the case of a less-than-perfectly-rational individual the price interval still represents a de facto strategy, but one that the agent herself may not be fully aware of. The rules governing the dynamics of the threshold values may be as complicated as desired, simultaneously incorporating amongst many other things: rational strategies based upon optimization of utility functions or econometrics or technical analysis; past performance; adaptive heuristics; inductive learning; new information; tax issues; price data from alternative investment options; margin calls; perverse incentives; psychological effects; the weather; herding; imitation within a subset of closely-networked agents; and all the key findings of behavioural economics. Our main working asumption therefore is that all such effects are cumulative and can be applied to a single pair of thresholds -some effects will move a particular threshold inwards towards the current price (making it more likely that that threshold will be breached and the agent will switch) while others will move it outwards. In other words we are hypothesizing that an agent's past experience, present state and future expectations can be condensed into two price values, one on either side of the current price, and of course the current state of the agent. Information about the agents' state, threshold values and threshold dynamics are all carried over from one timestep to the next.
Thresholds are especially well-suited for incorporating some important aspects of agent behaviours and motivations in a very natural way. By ensuring that they are reset away from the current price after a switching, agents cannot switch arbitrarily often (which will be the case in the presence of non-negligible transaction costs). Similarly included is the 'anchoring' phenomenon whereby the price at which the agent last traded influences the value they place upon the asset and thus the price at which they next trade. In a similar vein, chartists and technical analysts have developed many observational rules to help them predict future market performance. A particularly simple kind concerns the existence of 'resistance levels' which, if breached, indicate a further price move in the same direction. If such an effect does indeed exist then it can be applied to the threshold dynamics of a subset of the agents (or it may even arise as a natural consequence of other rules). Taking this one step further, a subset of agents may be influenced by important-sounding numbers, such as 10000 on the DJIA, and consciously-or-not have a threshold at around that value 3 . As another example consider an individual who bought a dot-com stock at the top of the bubble and then held it all the way down to zero. In such a case, that agent's lower threshold decreased (due to loss aversion) even faster than the price while the upper threshold didn't decrease fast enough and so the stock was never sold. At the more rational end of the spectrum, a rational investor or computerized trading program (fundamentalist trader) that believes the current price to be too high, with no other complicating factors, will enter state −1 (if necessary) and then can be mimicked by setting the lower threshold at some point below the appraised price level and the upper level arbitrarily high.
Finally we point out that, as general as the above framework is, it can be made more sophisticated by allowing agents to own differing amounts of the asset, and perhaps even shorting. This can be achieved by assigning an (evolving) weight value to each threshold (upper and lower, separately) such that when that threshold is breached the agent buys or sells so as to own that amount of stock. However useful this may prove to be in the future, this is at odds with the current modelling philosophy as is now explained.
Thresholds, herding and rational expectations
The phenomenon that appears to be most important in the generation of fat-tails within threshold models is herding, whereby there is a tendency for (rational or otherwise) agents in the minority position to switch and join the majority. This can be incorporated into threshold dynamics in a very simple manner -agents in the minority position have their thresholds move inwards towards the current price thus making them more likely to switch and join the majority (unless the majority state changes first). Different agents have differing herding propensities that are reflected in the rate at which their thresholds move together.
Herding may be initiated, for example, by a widespread misconception about the present or the future (such as house prices never going down) or some systemic asymmetry 4 that causes agents to prefer one of the states over the other. Herding then provides a plausible positive-feedback mechanism. However, it must be emphasized that for many agents herding is a rational, not irrational, phenomenon. Indeed herding in the natural world is an effective survival strategy and the same is true in financial markets (as well as being a trading strategy in itself, often referred to as momentum trading). Professional investors risk losing their jobs, bonuses and/or investment capital if they deviate too far from the mean in what turns out to be the wrong direction. Thus there is a strong motivation to play safe and 'chase the average'. This naturally (and rationally from the point of view of the agents theselves) leads to herding.
Our modelling philosophy is more concerned with explanations than predictions and this is easier to achieve with simple models. In particular it is of interest to try and identify the simplest model that can approximate the most important stylized facts. However, there is a deeper motivation which is to question one of the cornerstones of modern efficient market theory.
In the same way that it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between a random sequence of numbers and the output of a complicated but deterministic algorithm, it might also be extremely hard to distinguish an agent employing a random strategy (a zero-intelligence agent) from a highly-sophisticated one. When one considers the aggregate output over a large number of agents and the presence of random information entering the market, the problem becomes even worse. Thus, in principle, one may replace sophisticated agents with simple ones. The neoclassical concept of rational expectations [20] takes this argument one step further to propose that each (highly intelligent and computationally intensive) agent may be incorrect in their predictions and beliefs but the population average is correct and the market as a whole can be modelled using a single representative agent. But this line of reasoning is only valid if the agents' strategies are independent, unbiased and uncoupled. If there are systemic biases present (or coupling, either through direct interaction or via a common signal such as the market price) then mispricing can occur. The most obvious examples of such biases are herding (both rational and irrational), widespread misconceptions or mass delusions, moral hazard and perverse incentives.
Numerical Simulations
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a detailed numerical investigation since results from a similar model (using two pairs of static thresholds for each agent) are compared against the stylized facts in [17] and further numerical results for a moving threshold model can be found in [18] . However, for completeness, we provide enough details for reproduction of the numerical results and highlight the main findings of previous studies. The model is kept as simple as possible and so apart from including herding and a volatility function f (σ) = 1 + 2|σ| we assume that agents thresholds are reset after a switching from a specified random distribution, and the thresholds are static when an agent is in the majority.
The timestep h is defined in terms of the variance of the external information stream. A daily variance in price returns of 0.6-0.7% implies that h of 0.000004 should correspond to approximately 1/10 of a trading day. The results of 10 conscutive timesteps are then combined to give the daily price return.
The parameter κ = 0.1 and all agents have equal weight. The reset thresholds after a switching at price P are
where Z L , Z U are each chosen from the uniform distribution on the interval [0.05, 0.25], corresponding to price moves in the range 5-25%. The model is very robust to changes in these parameters and in the absence of further information they are chosen to be as simple as possible.
Herding is introduced by supposing that for agents in the minority position only
while for those in the majority
Note that the drift in the position of the thresholds is proportional to the length of the timestep and the magnitude of the sentiment. The constant of proportionality C i is different, but fixed, for each agent and chosen from the uniform distribution on [20, 100] . This range of parameters corresponds to a herding tendency that operates over a timescale of a few months or longer. Figure 2 shows the price output of the model (the more volative curve) against the 'efficient' pricing (less volatile) obtained from (2) The density of the thresholds along the price axis for agents in each of the two states. The current price p n is set to be 0 for convemience. Note the imperfect mixing.
Measurements of power-law exponents, similar to those carried out in [17] , provided estimates close to those observed in analyses of price data from real markets for the tail of the price returns and the decay of the autocorrelation function, typically in the range [2.8, 3.2] .
In the absence of herding, i.e. when C i = 0 ∀i, then, provided that the initial states s i (0) of the agents are sufficiently mixed, σ(n) ≈ 0 ∀n and p(t) always remains close to the efficient market price. Such a model is both practically and philosophically recognizable as the neoclassical notion of an efficient marketagents trade due to differing expectations but the averaging procedure inherent in the rational expectations assumption is valid and no mispricing occurs. However, Figure 5 is a snapshot of the system for the simulation of Figure 2 (herding included) at a point in time when σ ≈ 0. The two displayed histograms are the density of thresholds for agents in the two states +1 and −1 plotted separately. The main point to note is the discrepancy between the two density functions which indicates that as the system evolves and the price fluctuates, σ will move away from 0 because the agent thresholds are not perfectly mixed.
Finally we note that there are different causal mechanisms for volatility clustering and fat-tails. If f ≡ 1 (i.e. the fast agents are correctly interpreting new Gaussian information) then herding induces fat-tails but there is no volatility clustering. Thus, within this class of models, systemic biases among the slow agents cause fat-tails while the imperfect interpretation of information by the fast agents results in volatility clustering. 
A Queueing Theory Description of Price Cascades over Short Timescales
We are interested primarily in the tail-distribution of price returns. Since the information stream is modelled as Gaussian, extreme price moves are due to cascades of buying or selling affecting (2) with κ > 0. Without loss of generality we shall consider a selling cascade. Figure 6 shows the start of such a possible selling cascade within the threshold model of Section 2. The circles and crosses to the left of the current price indicate the positions of the lower thresholds of the slow agents. There are four points to consider before proceeding. Firstly, Figure 6 can act as a stand-alone model of a rapid deleveraging process. As the price falls and passes the lower thresholds of agents who are long, they switch pushing the price down further (for κ > 0) and triggering other agents to sell and so on. In such circumstances, the lower thresholds may in fact be the pricing points at which margin calls activate. Secondly, under the most extreme market conditions, the distinction between fast and slow agents made in Section 2 may be invalid as the amount of new information entering the system is negligible and all the agents are motivated by price changes. Thus M will be equal to the total number of agents, not just the number of slow ones. Thirdly, the distribution of thresholds is a function of the evolution of the system over a long period of time and may be highly non-uniform over the positive real line. Finally, although we are supposing that the cascade/relaxation process is instantaneous, in practice this is certainly not the case and agents' thresholds may move significantly between the start of the cascade and the end.
We consider the continuous-time version of the model outlined at the start of Section 2 and it will also be convenient to introduce the log-price P (t) = ln p(t). At the start of the cascade the price is fluctuating due to the arrival of new information and the action of the fast traders. Then at some value P * it equals one of the thresholds of agent i who is in the +1 state. We now consider the cascade to be a relaxation process that occurs instantaneously. The log-price jumps downwards by an amount κ∆σ = 2κw i /W as the agent switches and its thresholds jump to a non-zero distance away. If there is no other agent with its lower threshold in the interval [P * , P * − 2κw i /W ] then the cascade stops immediately. If there is such an agent, or agents, then the cascade continues.
During the relaxation process, there may be agents in the opposite state caught in the cascade whose switching will act in the opposite price direction and help to bring the cascade to an end. Once the cascade is over, time restarts and P (t) evolves under the action of the information stream until another threshold is met. Now consider the following scenario from queueing theory [6] . A customer, named i, arrives at an empty single-server queue. If she is served before another customer arrives then the busy period of the queue, defined to be the length of time it is in existence, is simply the time taken to serve her, call it 2κw i /W . If on the other hand other customers arrive before she is served then the queue continues until they are all served. However, we must also allow for the possibility that some people in the queue may decide to leave it before being served -this is referred to in the queueing theory literature as reneging.
There exists an almost exact correspondence between these two situations. Price in the market model corresponds to time in the queueing problem, the size of the trade the agent wishes to make corresponds to the length of time taken to serve that customer, and the overall price change during the cascade maps to the busy period of the queue. Agents in the opposite state caught up in the cascade act as 'anti-customers' whose arrival in the queue causes them to cancel out with an agent, or agents, of the same total weight/service time. This is of course equivalent to those agents deciding to renege and leave the queue. A subtle, but negligible, difference is that in the market cascade an agent j in the opposite state getting caught up in the process should correspond to a customer, or customers, of the same total 'size' w j /W reneging from the queue. But if w j is sufficiently large then there may not be enough total weight in the queue for this to happen (i.e. at the end of a selling cascade a small 'bounce' may occur in the price but customers who have already been served cannot leave a queue).
Queueing theory has a standard notation for describing queues. A queue (without reneging) is X/Y /n where X describes the distribution of arrivals, Y the serving times and n is the number of servers. Below we shall only consider cases where X, Y = M or G and n = 1. M corresponds to exponentiallydistributed arrival or service times generated by a Poisson process while G is a general distribution, usually under some assumption of finite moments. In the case of an M/M/1 queue the Poisson parameters for X and Y are λ and µ respectively.
We now proceed by stating results from queueing theory concerning the distribution of the busy period under progressively weaker assumptions. While none of these results apply directly to price cascades under all circumstances, they may be indicative of an underlying explanation for the apparent universality of sub-exponential decays in price returns [19] .
First consider an M/M/1 queue without reneging. Using standard arguments [6] , if ρ = λ/µ < 1 then the busy period τ of the queue is finite with probability 1 and the entire distribution is given by
where I 1 (·) is the first modified Bessel function of the first kind. Furthermore explicit formulae exist for the moments and
(generalizations for M/M/1 queues with various reneging assumptions can be found in [14] ). In fact (4) holds for M/G/1 queues without reneging if ρ = λ/E(Y ) < 1. The generalization of (3) to M/G/1 queues is provided by the Takacs Equation: if Y * (s) is the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the cumulative density function of
This functional equation already hints at a very close connection between the tail of the agents' weight distribution and the tail of the price return distribution (see also [13, 25, 24, 14] ).
The above results for M/G/1 queues without reneging may be applicable to smaller and intermediate-size cascades where the reneging (equivalent to the arrival of agents who are switching in the opposing direction) can be simulated by appropriately modifying the service time distribution and, in particular, decreasing E(Y ). However, especially for larger cascades, the assumption of a constant reneging rate is not appropriate. In simulations it is observed that for some cascades the initial value of ρ exceeds unity, corresponding to a supercritical process and a queue that would become infinitely long with non-zero probability. The mechanism that ultimately stops the cascade is the rearrival of agents who have already been through the cascade once. For example, an agent who was fortunate or smart enough to sell at the start of a selling cascade may eventually reenter the process but making the opposite trade, reaping an actual as opposed to hypothetical profit, and acting as a brake rather than an accelerator. Thus financial cascades have a propensity to be self-limiting. The way to model such an effect within queueing theory is to suppose that the reneging rate is an increasing function of time and/or queue length [23, 3, 4] .
We end by noting that price-return tails are an aggregate of many different cascades that almost certainly have differing queueing parameters. Thus a precise analysis of the busy-period distributions may not be necessary to explain the observed functional forms of the tails.
Conclusions
Even very simple threshold models appear to be capable of capturing the most important statistical aspects of financial markets. They also better reflect the incremental and history-dependent nature of decision-making processes. Furthermore, since the neoclassical paradigm exists within this class of models, it is possible to systematically study the ways in which weakening various efficient market assumptions, as reflected in the model, change the global behaviour of the system. In this sense, the framework presented in Section 2 can be considered as a set of thought experiments that can be used to query the efficient market assumptions.
The numerics in Section 3 focussed upon herding as the principle cause of deviation from an otherwise efficient market. This is because many important real-world factors such as psychology, bonus/commission criteria and other compensation practices, and moral hazard all produce a similar effect; namely, that one side of a trade or market position becomes more attractive than the other and then herding provides a positive feedback mechanism.
The main result of this paper is to demonstrate how queueing theory can be applied to financial models. It is unlikely that the two cited results, concerning the kurtosis and tail-distribution of the busy periods of single-server queues, can be accurately applied to any real market cascade. However, it is possible that the analytical methods of queueing theory may provide an explanation for the universality seen in the tail statistics. Queueing theory may also suggest simple 'stress-test' models for simulating bank-runs and deleveraging cascades.
Finally, in this paper the attention has been on the slow traders and hence the threshold dynamics. However, such threshold models can be fused, in a very intuitive way, with order-book models that analyze high-frequency output of financial exchanges. Such a hybrid model would be computationally very intensive, since it must directly simulate the fast traders as well as the slow ones, but would be able to mimic many different real-world effects across multiple timescales.
